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THEDIFFERENT FACES OF ENERGY
CONSUMERS: TOWARD A BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS APPROACH
Saskia Anna Catharina Maria Lavrijssen
ABSTRACT
In the European legislator’s view, energy consumers have an important role to
play in achieving the EU energy policy objectives. These include promoting com-
petition, ensuring affordable energy prices and security of supply, as well as con-
tributing to the European environmental and climate goals. Although the
legislator has high expectations of energy consumers, empirical research into
their behavior has shown that, in practice, they fulfill their role as drivers of com-
petition only partially, if at all. There are also indications that energy consumers
do little to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and make hardly if any use of
existing opportunities to save energy. This article analyzes what insights from be-
havioral economics can mean for the legislator’s assumptions on the role of
energy consumers, as well as for shaping and regulating the energy sector. It also
examines the implications of these insights for the practices of energy supervisory
authorities entrusted with applying the European energy directives. The possibil-
ities and limitations of the use of behavioral economics’ insights in the regulation
of the energy sector will be reflected upon.
JEL: K20; K21; K23; K42
I. INTRODUCTION
Since July 1, 2007, the European energy directives have formally allowed
energy consumers to choose their suppliers, while the gas and electricity
markets in some Member States, such as the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, opened up to retail competition even before 2007.
The European energy directives were originally based on the traditional
economic assumption that encouraging competition contributes to the
freedom for all household and other consumers to choose their supplier.1
Consumers’ freedom to choose their supplier is one of the objectives of the
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1 Kati J. Cseres, What Has Competition Done for Consumers in Liberalised Markets?, 4 COMPETITION
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energy directives and also has an instrumental function. The European legisla-
tor hoped that, by promoting competition and free choice of supplier, supply
companies would become more efficient, which in turn would increase the
quality of supply and the variety of energy contracts as well as achieve more
competitive and affordable energy prices. Furthermore, according to Jan
Potters and Henriette Prast, if markets work well, consumers are properly
informed, and there is a level playing field, individuals will make the choices
most likely to result in achieving their goals in the given circumstances.2
A new perspective, not inextricably linked to market liberalization, is that
both the Third Energy Package (the “Third Package”), consisting of two direc-
tives and three regulations,3 and the recently modified Directive on Energy
Efficiency take the view that consumers have to be encouraged toward more
efficient energy use.4 The European legislator presumes, therefore, that consu-
mers can also play an active role in reducing CO2 emissions and in achieving
the environmental and climate goals of European energy policy.5
Although the legislator has high expectations of energy consumers, empiric-
al research into their behavior has shown that, in practice, they fulfill their role
as drivers of competition only partially, if at all.6 An alarming European
Commission report from 2010 found the retail energy markets to be among
the least efficient markets in the European Union. In many EU countries,
fewer than 10 percent of consumers have switched to a new electricity sup-
plier.7 According to this research, European consumers could have saved up to
2 Jan J.M. Potters & Henriette M. Prast, Gedragseconomie in de Praktijk, in DE MENSELIJKE
BESLISSER: OVER DE PSYCHOLOGIE VAN KEUZE EN GEDRAG 47–60 (Will L. Tiemeijer, Casper
A. Thomas & Henriette M. Prast eds., Amsterdam Univ. Press 2009).
3 Directive 2009/72/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 2003/
54/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 211) 55; Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 13 July 2009 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas and
Repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 211) 94; Regulation 713/2009 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 Establishing an Agency for Cooperation of
Energy Regulators, 2009 O.J. (L 211) 1; Regulation 714/2009 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 July 2009 on Conditions for Access to the Network for Cross-Border
Exchanges in Electricity and Repealing Regulation 1228/2003, 2009 O.J. (L 211) 15; Regulation
715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on Conditions for
Access to the Natural Gas Transmission Networks and Repealing Regulation 1775/2005, 2009
O.J. (L 211) 36.
4 Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Energy Efficiency, Amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and Repealing
Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 1.
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Energy Roadmap 2050, COM (2011) 885
final (Dec. 15, 2011); Commission Green Paper, A 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies,
COM (2013) 169 final (Mar. 27, 2013).
6 Ans Kolk, The Role of Consumers in EU Energy Policy, 3 CARBON MGMT. 175 (2012).
7 The Functioning of Electricity Retail Markets for Consumers in the European Union, SEC
(2010) 1409 final (Nov. 11, 2010) [hereinafter The Functioning of Electricity Retail Markets];
Energy Markets in the European Union in 2011—Accompanying the Communication from the
Page 2 of 35 Journal of Competition Law& Economics






€13 billion if they had switched to another supplier. A low switching percent-
age may indicate that consumers made little if any use of the opportunity to
save on their energy bills. However, the switching percentages alone do not ne-
cessarily give an accurate and complete picture of the reality in these specific
markets. These percentages have to be analyzed in the wider context of the
market’s structure and the behavior of market parties, including consumers.8
After all, if 10 percent of consumers opt for another supplier and the former
monopolist responds by cutting down its tariffs to more competitive levels, the
situation of the remaining 90 percent of the consumers may also improve as a
result of the latter group voicing dissatisfaction with the current situation.9
There are also indications that energy consumers do little to reduce CO2
emissions and make little if any use of existing opportunities to save energy.10
Recently, Dirk Brounen, Niels Kok, and John Quigley published an empirical
study that found that a significant number (44 percent) of Dutch energy
households did not know the amount of their energy bill, and that 40 percent
of this group was unable rationally to assess the short- and long-term costs and
benefits when considering making their homes more energy efficient.11
The above studies lead to the central theme of this article: What lessons can
the European legislator draw from behavioral economics when assigning
certain roles to consumers? This relatively new field of study within economics
employs psychological insights, based on empirical research, to explain the
choices made by individuals.12 The European Commission and national
supervisory authorities are devoting increasing attention to behavioral research
in an effort to understand the psychological factors—such as cognitive
Commission: Making the Internal Energy Market Work, Commission Staff Working Document, SWD
(2012) 368 final (Nov. 15, 2012).
8 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (Harvard Univ. Press 1970); Albert O. Hirschman, “Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty”: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions, 13 SOC. SCI. INFO. 7
(1974).
9 Maarten P. Schinkel, Operatie MDW: Een Tussenstand, 4464 ECONOMISCHE STATISTISCHE
BERICHTEN 18 (2005); Ulf Schrader, The Moral Responsibility of Consumers as Citizens, 2 INT’L
J. INNOVATION & SUSTAINABLE DEV. 79 (2007).
10 Elke U. Weber, Doing the Right Thing Willingly, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 380
(Eldar Shafir ed., Princeton Univ. Press 2012).
11 DIRK BROUNEN, NILS KOK & JOHN M. QUIGLEY, RESIDENTIAL ENERGY LITERACY AND
CAPITALIZATION 3 (Tilburg Univ. 2012), available at http://www.econtrack.nl/uploads/document/
Energy%20Literacy.pdf.
12 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (Penguin 2011); Will L. Tiemeijer & Casper
A. Thomas, Inleiding, in DE MENSELIJKE BESLISSER: OVER DE PSYCHOLOGIE VAN KEUZE EN
GEDRAG, supra note 2, at 11; Hans-W. Micklitz, Lucia A. Reisch & Kornelia Hagen, An
Introduction to the Special Issue on “Behavioural Economics, Consumer Policy, and Consumer Law,”
34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 271 (2011); Richard Thaler & Cas R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism
Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); RICHARD THALER & CAS. R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE, IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Yale Univ. Press
2008).
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limitations, emotions, moral considerations, biases, perceptions, and heuris-
tics—that influence the actual behavior of energy consumers.13 Understanding
these factors will help authorities to establish whether consumers can really act
in a manner that will help to achieve goals that are in the public interest, such
as competition, economic growth, and protection of the environment. And if
consumers cannot act in this way, how can authorities achieve a change in be-
havior that will help attain the legislator’s goals?
This article focuses on what insights from behavioral economics can mean
for the legislator’s assumptions on the role of energy consumers, as well as for
shaping and regulating the energy sector. It also examines the possible implica-
tions of these insights for the practices of energy supervisory authorities
entrusted with applying the European energy directives. For instance, more
insights into consumer preferences and behavior can give input to the legislator
and supervisory authorities as to how to design the choice architecture—the
(legal, economic, social, and factual) context in which consumers make deci-
sions—in the energy sector.14
Under the Electricity Act of 1998 and the Gas Act of 2000, the Authority
for Consumers and Markets (ACM) is the authority responsible for ensuring
implementation of the European energy directives in the Netherlands. The
U.K. counterpart of the ACM is the Office of the Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem). In discussing various instruments for steering consumer behavior,
the article refers to examples applied by Ofgem and the ACM. While Ofgem
has taken the lead in applying a behavioral approach to regulating the energy
sector in the European Union, the ACM has also started pursuing a similar
strategy for enhancing consumer participation in the energy markets. While
highlighting the practice of the two aforementioned authorities, this article will
also refer to recent and essential research into the behavior of energy consu-
mers conducted in other EU Member States (for example, Austria, Germany,
Denmark, and France). The results of these researches have a broader
relevance, as they illustrate the major impact that small interventions (such as
the introduction of default contracts and labeling information) can have on
consumer behavior in the energy sector.
The advantages and disadvantages of different instruments and interven-
tions for steering consumer behavior will be analyzed. Furthermore, a distinc-
tion will be made between legally binding instruments, economic incentives,
and psychological forms of control—in other words, the nudges that can influ-
ence consumer behavior. Richard Thaler and Cas Sunstein introduced the
term nudge to describe psychological steering instruments that push consumers
13 OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS? (Office
of Gas and Electricity Markets Discussion Paper 2011), available at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/
ofgem-publications/75192/behaviouraleconomicsgbenergy.pdf; OXERA, BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS
AND ITS IMPACT ON COMPETITION POLICY (2013), available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/download/
bijlage/?id=11161.
14 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 3.
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in a direction desired by the government.15 A nudge does not involve any coer-
cion, such as excluding certain options or influencing economic incentives.
Instead, the focus is on much softer forms of steering, based on psychological
factors that play a crucial role in the process that consumers undergo when
making choices; for instance, how changing the default choices may result in
significant changes in the market. Thaler and Sunstein refer to the famous
research of Eric Johnson and Daniel Goldstein that shows the drastic conse-
quences of changing the explicit consent required for becoming an organ donor
(opt in) into presumed consent, where people not wishing to donate organs have
to opt out.16 The latter situation will significantly increase the number of donor
organs available. As will be explained below, nudges, such as setting default
choices for contracts to supply energy from renewable resources, can also be
deployed in the choice architecture for the energy market and can have a major
impact on consumer behavior.17
II. ENERGY CONSUMERS ANDTHEIR VARIOUS ROLES
A. The Various Faces of Energy Consumers
Before investigating the relevant behavioral economics insights regarding the
behavior of energy consumers, it is important to analyze what the legal defini-
tions of different types of energy consumers are on the basis of EU law. This
analysis is necessary for ascertaining whether the legal definitions in EU law
can sufficiently protect the consumers against unfair and misleading trade
practices and empower them to actively engage in the energy market, taking
into account the characteristics of different types of consumers that may be dis-
tinguished on the basis of behavioral research in the energy market.18
From a European law perspective, energy consumers have various faces.
First, the Third Package’s directives distinguish among groups of consumers
such as wholesale customers, household customers, non-household custo-
mers, and vulnerable customers.19 Energy consumers can also be looked at
from the perspective of the different roles assigned to them by the European
legislator that can be fulfilled either actively or passively. This article focuses
on the definition and roles of household consumers-customers in the energy
directives and the EU consumer protection directives.
15 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 6.
16 Id. at 184; Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 POL’Y FORUM
1338 (2003).
17 Daniel Pichert & Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults: Information Presentation and
Pro-Environmental Behaviour, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 63 (2008).
18 Bram B. Duivenvoorde, The Protection of Vulnerable Consumers Under the Unfair Commercial
Practices Directive, 2 J. EUR. CONSUMER &MKT. L. 61 (2013).
19 Simone Pront-van Bommel, De Energieconsument Centraal?, in DE CONSUMENT EN DE ANDERE
KANT VAN DE ELEKTRICITEITSMARKT 18 (S. Pront van-Bommel ed., Univ. of Amsterdam,
Centrum voor Energievraagstukken 2010).
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B. Household Consumers and the Average Consumer
When interpreting the concept of a consumer other than a business or profes-
sional customer, the starting point in European consumer law is the average
consumer—that is, the reasonably well informed and reasonably observant
and circumspect consumer.20 Regarding this standard, Bram Duivenvoorde
observed that, from a European law perspective, the consumer is expected to
act rationally on the basis of the available information.21 Although consumer
law offers considerable protection against misrepresentation and misleading
behavior (by enterprises) in certain circumstances, consumers themselves,
according to Duivenvoorde, are also responsible for ensuring they are not
misled. Indirectly, through the criterion of the “average consumer,” the law
imposes a behavioral standard on consumers. According to Vanessa Mak, the
need to ensure consistent application of the “average consumer” criterion
means that the high threshold for consumer protection imposed by this criter-
ion should be lowered only when a higher level of consumer protection is justi-
fied.22 The two questions that arise are, first, to what extent does this
behavioral standard apply to energy consumers, and, second, can an increased
level of protection for these consumers be justified? The next part attempts to
answer these questions.
1. Who Is the Average Energy Consumer?
The energy directives do not use the word “consumer,” but the word “house-
hold customer” to reflect the households purchasing and using energy.23
According to Directive 2009/72/EC, a household customer is a “customer pur-
chasing electricity for his own household consumption, excluding commercial
or professional activities.”24 It is not immediately clear whether this energy
customer-consumer is also expected to act rationally like the average consumer
in general consumer law. A closer inspection of the EU energy directives
20 See Case 210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt—Amt
für Lebensmittelüberwachung, 1998 E.C.R. I-4657 (ground 37); Rosealla Incardona &
Cristina Poncibo, The Average Consumer, The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, and the
Cognitive Revolution, 30 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 21 (2007); Vanessa Mak, Standards of Protection:
In Search of the “Average Consumer” of EU Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive, 19
EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 25 (2011); Jan Trzaskowski, Behavioural Economics, Neuroscience, and the
Unfair Commercial Practises Directive, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 377 (2011); Sybe A. de Vries,
Consumer Protection and the EU Single Market Rules—The Search for the “Paradigm Consumer,” 4
J. EUROPEAN CONSUMER &MKT. L. 228 (2012); Duivenvoorde, supra note 18.
21 Bram B. Duivenvoorde, De “Gemiddelde Consument” als Rationele Actor, 141 WEEKBLAD VOOR
PRIVAATRECHT, NOTARIAAT EN REGISTRATIE 533 (2010). See also Cees van Dam, De Gemiddelde
Euroconsument—Een Pluriform Fenomeen. Over de Richtlijn Oneerlijke Handelspraktijken en de
Rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie, 1 SEW 3 (2009).
22 Mak, supra note 20, at 42.
23 Hans-W. Micklitz, Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer Law? A
Thought-Provoking Impulse 28 (European Univ. Institute of Florence, Working Papers 23,
2012).
24 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, ¶ 10.
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reveals that energy consumers are protected and empowered by a significant
number of additional rules.
In the Third Package, household consumers are first of all subject to protec-
tion, as can be inferred from the emphasis on the importance of guaranteeing
and strengthening their rights in the energy market.25 The Third Package’s
directives grant extra protection to household customers by requiring Member
States to ensure that these customers enjoy a universal service. In other words,
these customers are entitled to be supplied with electricity and, once con-
nected, with gas, both of a specified quality and at reasonable, easily and
clearly comparable, transparent, and nondiscriminatory prices within their
territory.26
Under the Third Package’s directives, Member States are not only obliged
to adopt measures to protect consumers, but also to encourage household con-
sumers to become active market players. The Commission believes that it is
not sufficient solely to protect consumers against unfair commercial practices
and abuse of market power by energy suppliers. Consumers should also be
empowered so that they are confident and able to actively participate in the
energy market, as desired by the European legislator. Active consumer partici-
pation is assumed to stimulate competition between energy suppliers, leading
to more efficiency, more affordable energy prices, and ultimately more eco-
nomic growth in the European Union.
To stimulate consumer participation, the Third Package’s directives contain
some minimum requirements concerning consumer empowerment. The
notion of “consumer empowerment” is currently a central issue in European
consumer policy, both in general consumer law and in the specific consumer
law provisions that are applicable to the energy sector.27 The term includes
assisting energy consumers by providing them with clear and user-friendly in-
formation about their rights, their energy consumption, the price of their energy
supply, and effective dispute-settlement and complaint-handling procedures, as
well as by providing them with information about access to representative orga-
nizations promoting consumers’ interests.28 Consumer empowerment sets
requirements in respect of the quality of the information required by European
law to be provided to energy consumers.29 It is not sufficient for consumers
simply to receive an annual bill showing their total energy consumption. Under
European law, they also must be informed about their actual energy consumption
25 Id. at point 51, Annex I.
26 Id. at art. 3; Directive 2009/73/EC, supra note 3, art. 3.
27 MICHELA NARDO, MASSIMO LOI, ROSANNA ROSATI & ANNA MANCA, THE CONSUMER
EMPOWERMENT INDEX—A MEASURE OF SKILLS, AWARENESS AND ENGAGEMENT OF EUROPEAN
CONSUMERS, JRC SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REPORT NO. EUR 24791 (Publications Office of
the European Union, 2011).
28 Consumer Empowerment in the European Union, SEC (2011) 469 final (Apr. 7, 2011).
29 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, at point 50–55, art. 3, ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12.
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and the corresponding costs sufficiently frequently to allow them to adjust
their patterns of consumption.30
To ensure that energy consumers have access to data on their actual energy
consumption and the corresponding costs, the Third Package’s directives
encourage Member States to introduce smart metering systems that support
consumers’ active involvement in the electricity and gas supply markets.31 A
smart meter is a digital meter that measures electricity consumption in almost
real time (that is, in intervals of a quarter of an hour) and allows remote read-
ings.32 The rollout of smart metering systems was already promoted by
Article 13 of Directive 2006/32/EC.33 This directive has recently been repealed,
with the new directive setting stricter requirements for the feedback on con-
sumption and costs that must be provided to consumers.34 Smart meters are
seen as an enabler of advanced feedback systems that allow registered consump-
tion data to be made available to consumers on a display in their living room or
on a website.35 As a smart meter can measure energy consumption in intervals
of one-quarter of an hour, energy consumption data can be linked to pricing
schemes and demand response programs,36 which are programs that encourage
“changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consump-
tion patterns in response to the changes in the price of electricity over time, or to
incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high
wholesale market prices.”37 Prices can be transmitted through a display to con-
sumers, who can then assess whether, at a specific moment, it is financially
attractive to consume less electricity or to postpone consumption until a later
time. It should be noted, however, that the extent to which consumers react to
price incentives, rather than to other measures linked to the smart grids, is cur-
rently still unclear.38
30 Id. at point 50, art. 1, ¶ i.
31 Id. at art. 2.
32 Commission Recommendation of 9 March 2012 on Preparations for the Roll-Out of Smart
Metering Systems (2012/148/EU), 2012 O.J. (L 73) 9; Robin Hoenkamp, George B. Huitema
& Adrienne de Moor-van Vugt, The Neglected Consumer: The Case of the Smart Meter Rollout in
the Netherlands, 4 J. RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL’Y 269, 273–82 (2011).
33 Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on
Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services and Repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC,
2006 O.J. (L 114) 64.
34 Directive 2012/27/EU, supra note 4.
35 MARTIJN J. BLOM, MART BLES, COR LEGUIJT, FRANS J. ROOIJERS, ROB VAN GERWEN, DAAN
VAN HAMEREN & FRITS VERHEIJ, MAATSCHAPPELIJKE KOSTEN EN BATEN VAN INTELLIGENTE
NETTEN 31 (CE Delft 2012).
36 Annelies Huygen, De Consument en de (On)vrije Elektriciteitsmarkt, in DE CONSUMENT EN DE
ANDERE KANT VAN DE ELEKTRICITEITSMARKT, supra note 19, at 123–25; Michael G. Pollitt &
Irina Shaorshadze, The Role of Behavioral Economics in Energy and Climate Policy 7–8 (EPRG
Working Paper 1130, Cambridge Univ. 2011).
37 Moustafa M. Eissa, Demand Side Management Program Evaluation Based on Industrial and
Commercial Field Data, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 5961, 5961 (2011).
38 BLOM, BLES, LEGUIJT, ROOIJERS, VAN GERWEN, VAN HAMEREN & VERHEIJ, supra note 35, at
11–14.
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Consumers are not only active in the market as customers, but sometimes also
as producers of electricity, a role in which they are known as “prosumers” (that
is, producer-consumers).39 In response to rising energy prices, cheaper techni-
ques for producing energy for own consumption, and the development of
smart grids, more and more household consumers are expected in the future
to start producing their own energy by, for example, installing solar panels on
their roofs or joining an energy cooperative that operates a windmill.40 Consumers
can then consume the energy they need themselves, while selling the remainder
back to the energy suppliers and, depending on the (usually still limited) legal
opportunities, to their neighbors.41 Annelies Huygen has shown that it is pos-
sible, in practice, for prosumers to create added flexibility for energy supply
companies by supplying energy to the latter in times of shortage or minimizing
pressure on the distribution networks by, for example, not using heating
pumps at peak loading times.42
The conditions in which consumers can act as producers by selling self-
produced energy and offering flexibility to energy companies fall under the
Member States’ policy discretion rather than being decided at a European
level.43 The energy directives do not yet provide for specific rules relating to
the empowerment and protection of energy consumers that ( jointly) act as
energy producers. This represents a tremendous challenge for energy legisla-
tors. Existing European and national energy legislation is based largely on the spe-
cific technological model of a few big power plants covering the energy needs of
all energy users within a certain territory. The question of how the current legal
framework can be adapted to take adequate account of the growing number of
smaller-scale, local projects producing energy from renewable energy sources has
yet to be answered.44
3. Vulnerable Consumers
The tension between the standard of the reasonably well informed and reason-
ably observant and circumspect consumer on the one hand and the average
energy consumer on the other is also exposed by the acknowledgement in the
Third Package’s directives that additional protection is needed for certain
39 Pront-van Bommel, supra note 19, at 24–27.
40 Id. at 24–27; INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012—
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (IEA Publications 2012).
41 SANNE AKERBOOM, GERRIT BUIST, ANNELIES HUYGEN & ANNETJE OTTOW, SMART GRID
PILOTS—HANDVATTEN VOOR TOEPASSING VAN WETTEN REGELGEVING—NASLAG:
ACHTERGROND EN VERDIEPING (Univ. of Amsterdam, Centrum voor Energievraagstukken,
Univ. of Utrecht, Europa Institute, TNO 2011).
42 Huygen, supra note 36, at 128.
43 AKERBOOM, BUIST, HUYGEN & OTTOW, supra note 41, at 45.
44 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON RENEWABLE ENERGY
(Council of the European Union 2012).
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groups of household consumers, specifically vulnerable consumers. Vulnerable
consumers can be seen as a group of consumers that have difficulties participat-
ing in and “cop[ing] with the requirements of the modern consumer society.”45
Therefore they risk ending up with overly expensive energy contracts and being
excluded from technological innovations such as the development of smart
meters, smart grids, and demand response programs.46
The Member States have to adopt measures to protect vulnerable custo-
mers, but have considerable freedom in determining which consumers fall
within this group and which do not.47 The concept of vulnerability may refer
to energy poverty, a situation in which a person has difficulty meeting his or
her own basic energy needs.48 When determining the limits of the vulnerable
consumers group, the legislator has to be aware that this is not a clearly
defined, static group of consumers.49 Qualifying groups as vulnerable is diffi-
cult, as vulnerability may depend on the individual and his or her specific
situation.50 The definition consequently has to leave sufficient scope for
assigning appropriate weightings to a series of multidimensional (personal and
external) factors contributing to the vulnerability.51 These factors can create
barriers preventing some consumers from gathering and processing informa-
tion and gaining access to advice and support. These in turn may make it diffi-
cult for such consumers to find the contracts best suited to their situation.52
Member States may not only take measures to protect vulnerable consumers
against energy poverty, but also help them to benefit from demand response
programs and other technological innovations to prevent them from being
excluded from participating in the energy sector and from social and economic
life in general.53
4. Consumers as Citizens
In addition to the specific consumer protection and empowerment rules, the
energy directives also contain provisions that stimulate consumers to act as
45 Micklitz, supra note 23, at 21.
46 SOPHIE NEUBURG, SMART GRIDS: FUTURE PROOFED FOR CONSUMERS? (Consumer Futures
2013).
47 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, at art. 3, ¶ 7.
48 FREDERIC HUYBRECHS, SANDRINE MEYER & JAN VRANKEN, ENERGIEARMOEDE IN BELGIË/LA
PRÉCARITÉ ÉNERGÉTIQUE EN BELGIQUE: FINAL REPORT 42 (Free Univ. of Brussels [ULB]
(CEESE), Univ. of Antwerp (OASeS) 2011).
49 OFGEM, PROPOSALS FOR A NEW CONSUMER VULNERABILITY STRATEGY 11–12 (Office of Gas
and Electricity Markets Consultation Paper 124/12, 2012).
50 Duivenvoorde, supra note 18, at 61–65.
51 MIKE GEORGE, COSMO GRAHAM & LINDA LENNARD, TOO MANY HURDLES: INFORMATION
AND ADVICE BARRIERS IN THE ENERGY MARKET 49–73 (Univ. of Leicester, Centre for
Consumers and Essential Services 2011); OFGEM, CONSUMER VULNERABILITY STRATEGY—
FINAL DECISION 102/13, at 12–18 (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 2013).
52 Marija Bartl, The Affordability of Energy, 33 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 225, 232–33 (2010); GEORGE,
GRAHAM & LENNARD, supra note 51, at 4–5.
53 NEUBURG, supra note 46.
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environmentally responsible consumers.54 The idea of the responsible con-
sumer is strongly related to the concept of consumers as citizens. This latter
concept reflects the idea that, by making economic decisions in the market and
exercising their political rights as citizens, household consumers may also direct
the way in which this market should operate, at least in their opinion.55 For in-
stance, by exercising their right to vote and taking part in decision-making pro-
cesses, consumers exert their influence as citizens on the laws governing the
energy markets and the roles that consumers play within these markets.56
As citizens, energy consumers possess certain rights, but they are also
assumed to have certain responsibilities to consider ethical, social, and envir-
onmental issues when exercising these rights and when participating in the
market.57 Energy consumers have in their capacity as citizens a core right to
enjoy a universal service, as laid down in the energy directives.58 Energy
supply is seen as a service of general economic interest within the meaning of
Article 106 TFEU and Article 36 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights.
Member States have to take the measures needed to ensure that energy consu-
mers genuinely have access to energy on reasonable, affordable, and nodiscri-
minatory terms.59 At their turn as citizens, consumers are expected to make
conscious and well-informed choices when exercising their right to choose
their own energy supplier.60 In making this choice, they should consider
aspects such as the environment by informing themselves, for example, about
green energy. They are expected to be aware of the environmental con-
sequences of their own energy consumption. The roll-out of smart meters
discussed above is not only important as a means of encouraging consumers
to be active market players: by providing information about actual energy con-
sumption and making behavioral change possible, smart meters will also help
54 HANS-W. MICKLITZ, ANDREAS OEHLER, MICHAEL-B. PIORKOWSKY, LUCIA A. REISCH &
CHRISTOPH STRTÜNCK, STATEMENT BY THE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD ON CONSUMER
AND FOOD POLICIES AT THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF FOOD, AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION OF GERMANY (BMELV) (2010).
55 Lucia A. Reisch & Hans-W. Micklitz, Consumers and Deregulation of the Electricity Market in
Germany, 29 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 399, 403–15 (2006); Sue McGregor, Consumer Citizenship: A
Pathway to Sustainable Development?, in DEVELOPING CONSUMER CITIZENSHIP—CONFERENCE
REPORT AND PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT i–xix (V. W. Thoresen ed., Hedmark Univ. College
2002); VICTORIA W. THORESEN, DEVELOPING CONSUMER CITIZENSHIP—CONFERENCE
REPORT AND PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT (Hedmark University College 2002).
56 Reisch & Micklitz, supra note 55, at 403; Jim Davies, Entrenchment of New Governance in
Consumer Policy Formulation: A Platform for European Consumer Citizenship Practice?, 32 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 245 (2009).
57 Schrader, supra note 9, at 81–83; Kati J. Cseres & Annette Schrauwen, Empowering
Consumer-Citizens: Changing Rights or Merely Discourse? 15 (Amsterdam Centre for European
Law and Governance, Research Paper No. 2012-03, 2012).
58 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, at art. 3, ¶ 2.
59 Jim Davies & Erica Szyszczak, Universal Service Obligations: Fulfilling New Generations of Services
of General Economic Interest, in DEVELOPMENTS IN SERVICES OF GENERAL INTEREST 155, 159
(Erika Szyszczak, Jim Davies, Mads Andenas & Tarjei Bekkedal eds., Asser Press 2011).
60 Schrader, supra note 9, at 85.
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consumers to consume energy more efficiently and appeal to their responsibil-
ity to use energy in a responsible way.61
C. The Relation Between the Energy Directives and General
Consumer Law
From the above, it becomes clear that the EU energy directives impose several
additional consumer protection and empowerment rules, such as transparency
obligations for energy suppliers, while also specifying the obligations contained
in general European consumer law.62 Suppliers, for instance, are required
always to provide information on applicable prices and tariffs and on the stand-
ard terms and conditions for access to and use of electricity services, and not
only in the form of the precontractual information required by the Directive on
Consumer Rights.63 In case C-92/11, RWE, Advocate General Trstenjak con-
sidered64 that the transparency requirements regarding general contractual
terms as set in the Directive 2003/55/EC can be seen as a special implementa-
tion within the energy sector of the transparency obligation set in the general
consumer Directive 93/13/EC.65 In explaining the relationship between sector-
related and general consumer law, the Advocate General also referred to a pre-
vious case of the Court,66 in which she concluded, among other things, that
various legislative acts of the European legislator in the area of consumer pro-
tection are bound to each other, and that each must be seen as part of a global
and uniform system of complementing measures.67
Although the energy directives provide an additional level of protection and
empowerment to the household energy consumers, no satisfactory answer has
yet been found to the question of whether the average energy consumer is the
same as the average consumer (“the reasonably well informed and reasonably ob-
servant and circumspect consumer”) in general EU consumer law. Given the
additional consumer protection requirements in the Third Package, the European
legislator would seem to be aware that energy consumers need additional advice,
61 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, at point 5.
62 Gordon Downie & Natasha Durkin, Consumer Protection in the Energy Sector: The Possibility of
Redress and the Impact of the New Consumer Rights Directive, 19 UTILITIES L. REV. 135 (2012).
63 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, at point 1b; Directive 2011/83/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on Consumer Rights, Amending Council
Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and Repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, art. 5.
64 See Case 92/11, RWE Vertrieb v. Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, 2012 E.C.R.
(Advocate General V. Trstenjak’s Conclusion at point 69), available at http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/liste.jsf?num=C-92/11.
65 Directive 2011/83/EU, supra note 63 (Directive Amended Through the Introduction of the
Directive on Consumer Rights in 2011).
66 Case 453/10, Jana Pereničová, Vladislav Perenič v. S.O.S. financ, spol. sro, 2011 E.C.R.,
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-453/10.
67 Id. at point 88.
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transparent and user-friendly information on prices and conditions, as well as
up-to-date and frequent feedback on their energy consumption, if they are to
make choices that are in their own interests.68 In this line of reasoning, a higher
level of protection is justified, especially for vulnerable consumers.
Looking at these developments, the standard of the “average energy con-
sumer” seems not to be the same as the standard of the “average consumer,”
to which the European Court of Justice refers when interpreting general
European consumer law.69 However, the energy directives do provide leeway
to deviate from this latter standard. Regarding the average consumer test from
the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Jan Trzakowksi considers that “the
average consumer test is flexible enough to allow the inclusion of research
within human decision making in order to apply a more realistic average con-
sumer than the currently applied Homo Economicus, who is expected to be
more rational than the ‘real’ average consumer.”70 This reflection seems also
to apply to the average energy consumer, leaving scope for the inclusion of a
more realistic view of the energy consumer when interpreting the specific pro-
visions on consumer protection and empowerment of the energy directives.
D. Toward a Target Group Specific Consumer Policy
Overall it seems that the European legislation is based on the assumption that
the consumer behaves or should behave in a rational or a “mature” and
“responsible” way.71 However, a paradox can be signaled. On the one hand,
European and national legislators have high expectations of average energy
consumers as far as promoting competition and achieving the European envir-
onmental and climate goals are concerned. On the other hand, the European
legislator is increasingly aware that average energy consumers have to be
empowered if they are to fulfill the roles of active and responsible consumers
that were assigned to them. There is a growing understanding that, in reality,
consumers behave differently than expected by the legislator. A large number
of consumers seem to act as “trusting consumers,” in that they have too little
time and too little patience to make well-informed decisions. In making their
decisions, many consumers trust on the information that is readily presented
to them and depend on support from intermediaries they trust (such as the
existing supplier).72 The European legislator increasingly deals with the
features of the real behavior of energy consumers. These developments indi-
cate that energy consumers—and within this group, vulnerable energy consu-
mers—are subject to a targeted, group-specific consumer policy. A targeted,
68 Duivenvoorde, supra note 21, at 3.
69 Incardona & Poncibo, supra note 20, at 21–38; Mak, supra note 20, at 25.
70 Trzaskowski, supra note 20, at 391.
71 MICKLITZ, OEHLER, PIORKOWSKY, REISCH & STRÜNCK, supra note 54, at 1–3.
72 Id.
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group-specific consumer policy in the energy sector could be legitimized by
the following reasons:
The energy retail market is characterized by certain features (contracts,
information, pricing models, uncertain costs, and benefits) that make it more
difficult for energy consumers to make optimal decisions in comparison with
other markets.
Therefore there is a risk that consumers do not make decisions that are
in their own interests and this threatens their right to universal service and—in
the case of vulnerable customers—may lead to energy poverty, social exclusion,
and health problems.
In addition, these developments may result in external effects such as less
competition on the retail market and negative effects for the environment (for
example, because of an inefficient use of energy).
However, the specific consumer policy in the energy sector is based on a
piecemeal approach and not on an adequate, transparent, and consistent justi-
fication for the deviation from the concept of the average consumer in EU law.
Behavioral economics studies of consumer behavior in the energy sector are
analyzed below in order to identify the characteristics of this behavior and the
potential bottlenecks preventing consumers from realizing the roles anticipated
by the legislator. It will be analyzed what these behavioral insights mean for
consumer policy in the energy sector and whether they can help to provide
legitimization for a target group specific consumer policy in the energy sector.
III. CONSUMERS AND THE FREEDOMOF CHOICE
A. Econs or Humans?
Traditional (neoliberal) economics and legislation are based on the assumption
of the rational choice model, according to which most consumers are Homo
Economicus (“Econs”).73 This theory sees consumers as perfect textbook exam-
ples of people who make economic decisions that maximize their welfare, based
on rational convictions and with sufficient knowledge and information.74
In practice, however, most people seem to be Homo Sapiens (“Humans”—as
referred to by Thaler and Sunstein). Human choice behavior is often based on
incorrect estimations of costs and benefits (biases) and is strongly influenced by
contextual factors, such as the way in which goods and product information are
presented (framing). This means that choices made do not always maximize an
individual’s profits.75 Economists can approach these phenomena in two ways.
73 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7.
74 Russel B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
75 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 7; Eric van Dijk & Marcel Zeelenberg, De (Ir)
rationaliteit van de Beslisser, in DE MENSELIJKE BESLISSER: OVER DE PSYCHOLOGIE VAN KEUZE
EN GEDRAG, supra note 2, at 24, 25–43; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 74.
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On the one hand, non-optimal choices by consumers can be explained, at least
in part, by traditional economic theory. On the other hand, they can also be
explained, again in part, from a behavioral economics perspective. Both perspec-
tives seem possible and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
If the phenomena are studied using the traditional choice model, the theory
most likely to be chosen will be the theory of bounded rationality.76 This
theory is based on the assumption that people are not irrational. They are
aware of the information available and the corresponding transaction costs
associated with the economic choices they must make. Sometimes, after
weighing the search and information costs, they deliberately, however, do not
make a well-informed choice. If, for example, a consumer will save €20 a year
by switching to another energy supplier, but it will take that consumer half a
day to identify the best option, the consumer may decide to stay with the
current supplier and to devote his free time to friends, hobbies, or the like.
This choice is not in line with the active conduct that the legislator expects
from consumers, but in the given circumstances is nevertheless a rational
choice.77 Measures to minimize consumers’ search and transaction costs also
accord with the traditional choice theory. These can include imposing add-
itional requirements for the provision of information on contracts, prices, and
conditions, as well as promoting quicker and easier switching procedures.
Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein, as well as the work of Tversky and
Kahneman, follows the second approach:78 that of behavioral economics. This
approach takes more account of the psychological reality behind the process
of choosing and sees consumers as creatures who often cannot make the
choice—even if they want to—that is optimal for their situation.79 According
to Eric Van Dijk and Marcel Zeelenberg, behavioral economics not only chal-
lenges the assumption underlying the rational choice model, but also, and
above all, attempts to add a new perspective by focusing on the psychological
decision-making process.80 Measures that government authorities can take to
encourage consumers to make the choices governments desire are seen as pa-
ternalistic by neoliberal economists and fall out of the rational choice model’s
scope. These measures may include providing convenient, user friendly infor-
mation on the characteristics and usage of products and services, providing
comparisons between the choice behavior and the behavior of neighbors or
role models (herd effect), or playing with default choices.
76 Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).
77 Schinkel, supra note 9, at D18–D20.
78 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
79 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 74; Daniel Kahneman,
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449–75
(2003).
80 Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, supra note 75, at 27.
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Making a choice between the above approaches does not fall within the
scope of this article. It does, however, provide sufficient leads to allow policy-
makers to rely on a rational choice model while taking the insights from behav-
ioral economics into account when formulating and implementing consumer
policy in the energy sector.81 As will be discussed below, various academic re-
search—as well as studies conducted in the energy sector by or on behalf of the
European Commission, the ACM, Ofgem and other supervisory authorities—
indicate that, when entering into energy supply contracts, consumers often fail
to make optimal choices in terms of price and quality.82 This is partly the
result of psychological factors that influence consumers’ behavior. Building on
earlier behavioral insights, Michael Pollitt and Irina Shaorshadze recognize
four categories of consumer biases that put traditional assumptions on the ra-
tionality of energy consumers into perspective.83
B. Time-Varying Discounts or Present-Biased Preferences
The first of these categories, according to Pollitt and Shaorshadze, is time-
varying discount rates or hyperbolic time discounting, which is also referred to
as present-biased preferences.84 This is the phenomenon whereby consumers’
preferences change depending on the periods within which they receive certain
financial benefits or have to pay for certain costs. These changing consumer
preferences are not based on an objective assessment of the costs and benefits
of various decisions, but on the immediate satisfaction of financial or other
needs. Often, consumers are tempted to assign more weight to short-term (im-
mediate) benefits than to longer-term benefits.85
It appears, for example, that consumers buying a dishwasher usually opt for
a cheaper, less energy-efficient model. Here, they act from a short-term
81 Amitai Etzioni, Behavioural Economics: Next Steps, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 277 (2011);
Franziska Rischkowsky & Thomas Döring, Consumer Policy in a Market Economy: Considerations
from the Perspective of the Economics of Information, the New Institutional Economics as well as
Behavioural Economics, 31 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 285 (2011).
82 ECME CONSORTIUM, THE FUNCTIONING OF RETAIL ELECTRICITY MARKETS FOR
CONSUMERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EAHC/FWC/2009 86 01, 2010); EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 2010, supra note 7; ACM, EVALUATIE ELEKTRICITEITSWET 1998 EN GASWET—
EINDVERSLAG (Authority for Consumers and Markets [Autoriteit Consument en Markt]
2012); OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?,
supra note 13.
83 Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 3 (referring to Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty, supra note 78; Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 78; Thaler &
Sunstein, supra note 12; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Colin F. Camerer, George
Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains, 106 SCANDINAVIAN
J. ECON. 555 (2004)).
84 Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 4. See alsoGeorge Loewenstein, Leslie K. John & Kevin
Volpp, Using Decision Errors to Help People Help Themselves, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
POLICY, supra note 10, at 361.
85 Loewenstein & Volpp, supra note 84; OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY
ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra note 13, at 14; Weber, supra note 10.
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perspective by letting the benefits of the lower initial investment costs outweigh
the longer-term advantages (such as lower energy bills) of purchasing a more
expensive, but also more efficient dishwasher. This explains why governments
sometimes reward consumers by subsidizing purchases of environmentally
friendly equipment, thereby emphasizing the benefits of a more expensive
product at the moment of purchase. Another instrument to stimulate the pur-
chase of efficient household appliances by consumers could be the disclosure
of information on lifetime energy costs. Steffen Kallbekken, Hakon Sælen, and
Erlend Hermansen recently conducted a field experiment over a 5-month
period in collaboration with an electric retailer to influence sales of energy-
efficient household appliances.86 Potential buyers of fridge-freezers and
tumble driers were provided information on the lifetime energy costs of house-
hold appliances trough a label and training of sales staff. For tumble driers, the
combined strategy reduced the average energy use of tumble driers sold by 4.9
percent (whereas for fridge freezers, no significant effect was found). In the case
of the sales staff training strategy, this number was 3.4 percent. The study shows
that, under certain conditions, making energy costs more salient to consumers
can induce consumers to buy more energy-efficient household appliances, at
least when it concerns appliances with high energy costs. Consequently, there is
potential for the realization of more energy savings and reduction in emissions
in the sale of appliances, which deserves further investigation.87
Similar to the purchase of household appliances, consumer decision
making also tends to be influenced by present-biased preferences when con-
cluding energy contracts. Consumers may in the short term allow the costs
of searching for the best energy contract to outweigh the potential longer-term
financial benefits they could achieve if they were to switch suppliers.88 This is
why consumers are more likely to opt for an offer from their current energy
supplier without comparing it to offers by other energy suppliers. More tar-
geted information strategies could be applied by supervisory authorities to
make consumers aware of the short-term and long-term benefits of different
types of energy contracts.
C. Prospect Theory
Second, Pollitt and Shaorshadze refer to the prospect theory developed by
Kahneman and Tversky, whereby consumers do not make decisions by weigh-
ing the expected absolute costs and benefits of certain economic choices
86 Steffen Kallbekken, Hakon Sælen & Erlend A.T. Hermansen, Bridging the Energy Efficiency
Gap: A Field Experiment on Lifetime Energy Costs and Household Appliances, 36 J. CONSUMER
POLICY 1 (2013).
87 Kallbekken, Sælen & Hermansen, supra note 86, at 9–15.
88 OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra
note 13, at 14.
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against each other, but instead by assessing the extent to which a choice differs
from specific reference points.89 As well as possession, the status quo is
another example of a reference point in relation to which consumers are loss
averse.90 In other words, consumers strongly prefer to prevent potential losses
rather than achieve potential gains, and thus show more willingness to take
risks to prevent loss than risks to achieve a profit. This results in a status quo
bias and inertia, with consumers feeling disinclined to investigate whether
choosing a different contract or another supplier would be beneficial. This in
turn prevents them from making a move.91 Empirical studies into consumer
behavior in the energy sector indicate that consumers have a preference for the
status quo and are loss averse. Energy consumers often report satisfaction with
the quality of the services offered by their own supplier, without even compar-
ing the prices and quality of these services with those of competitors.92 This
explains why consumers do not switch suppliers or may continue to use their
supplier’s default options (contracts that are preselected by the energy suppli-
ers), even though these are not always the most favorable for them. This behav-
ior may be strengthened by the fact that consumers may interpret defaults as
implicit recommendations of the companies or public authorities as good
options.93 Another relevant factor is that consumers may be afraid of losing
benefits (switching costs), such as reliability or a certain level of service.94
Some recent empirical studies illustrate that the power of defaults may be
strong in the energy sector where many energy consumers “are reluctant to ac-
tively choose a new power provider and do not opt out of the defaults.”95 For
instance, Kaenzig, Heinzle, and Wüstenhagen conducted a survey among 414
customers in Germany to investigate the hypothesis “whether consumers are
willing to pay a significant price premium for an upgrade from the current
default electricity mix to a more environmentally friendly electricity mix.”96
89 Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 4; KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, pt. IV; Kahneman &
Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 78.
90 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
91 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 8, 37.
92 The Functioning of Electricity Retail Markets, supra note 7, at 11; OFGEM, WHAT CAN
BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra note 13, at 13; ACM,
TRENDRAPPORTAGE MARKTWERKING EN CONSUMENTENVERTROUWEN IN DE ENERGIEMARKT
—TWEEDE HALFJAAR 2011 (Authority for Consumers and Markets [Autoriteit Consument en
Markt] 2012) [hereinafter ACMTRENDRAPPORTAGE 2011].
93 Pichert & Katsikopoulos, supra note 17, at 7.
94 KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 291; OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT
GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra note 13, at 13; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, supra note 17.
95 Josef Kaenzig, Stefanie L. Heinzle & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Whatever the Customer Wants, the
Customer Gets? Exploring the Gap Between Consumer Preferences and Default Electricity Products in
Germany, 53 ENERGY POL’Y 311, 311 (2013). See also Cas R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch,
Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection 7–8 (Social Science
Research Network 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2245657.
96 Kaenzig, Heinzle &Wüstenhagen, supra note 95, at 311.
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The results of the study could confirm this hypothesis for customers
in Germany, and another earlier study provided for similar results in
Switzerland.97 These studies illustrate that there may be a serious mismatch
between the actual preferences of energy consumers and the contracts that
they have actually concluded with energy suppliers. Another study (on the
basis of two natural experiments and two laboratory experiments conducted in
Germany) showed that the presentation of information about energy contracts
might have serious consequences for the contracts into which consumers are
entering. The changing of grey defaults into green defaults may lead to a sig-
nificant increase of the share of consumers buying green energy, even if the
green option is more expensive than the grey one.98
Though defaults may have a serious impact on the way consumers make
decisions, the actual impact of defaults will depend on contextual factors,
such as the income and social environment of consumers.99 For instance, the
green (but more expensive) options may be less attractive for low-income
groups. Furthermore, more experienced consumers may be less influenced by
defaults than inexperienced consumers. The attenuating effect of experience
on the impact of defaults was, for instance, shown by a field experiment of
Löfgren, Martinsson, Hennlock, and Sterner.100 The experiment was con-
ducted among participants of the 16th Annual Conference of the European
Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE)—who were
assumed to have “experience with carbon offsetting”—regarding their behav-
ior in compensating for the CO2 emissions that were related to their flights to
the conference venue.101 The researchers did not find significant effects of the
default option on the offsetting behavior of the conference participants.
The abovementioned insights explain why consumers who are satisfied with
their current energy supplier are reluctant to switch simply in order to achieve
the potential gains that a new supplier may be able to offer. If the information
on tariffs is also too complex, or the comparison of tariffs complicated and
time-consuming, this will merely accentuate the bias toward the status quo.102
As will be discussed below, these findings may have significant consequences
for designing the choice architecture in the energy sector in order to reach
public policy goals, such as the EU environmental and climate goals.
97 Andreas Burkhalter, Josef Kaenzig & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Kundenpräferenzen für Leistungsrelevante
Attribute von Stromprodukten, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ENERGIEWIRTSCHAFT 161 (2009).
98 Pichert & Katsikopoulos, supra note 17, at 5.
99 Sunstein & Reich, supra note 95, at 14–15.
100 Åsa Löfgren, Peter Martinsson, Magnus Hennlock & Thomas Sterner, Are Experienced People
Affected by a Pre-Set Default Option—Results from a Field Experiment, 63 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 66 (2012).
101 Löfgren, Martinsson, Hennlock & Sterner, supra note 100, at 67.
102 OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra
note 13, at 13.
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D. Simplified Choice Strategies
Consumers are cognitively limited and experience barriers when processing in-
formation, a phenomenon that can also be placed under the theory of bounded
rationality.103 According to the rational choice model, consumers consciously
assess search costs and gains to be achieved. Within a behavioral economics ap-
proach, the assumption is that consumers do not usually make this assessment,
but in fact perform an intuitive judgment based on simplified choice strategies
and decision-making rules of thumb that do not necessarily result in optimal
choices.104
The frequently cited study of Iygenar and Lepper shows that although
people like to be able to choose, a greater range of choices does not necessarily
make them happier.105 On the contrary, they can even become dissatisfied
(choice overload phenomenon).106 As a result, consumers often fail to maxi-
mize their use of information; instead, they stop searching at a certain point
and choose the first acceptable offer they encounter. The complexity of tariff in-
formation and the wide variety of tariff options in the energy sector constitute sig-
nificant barriers to switching.107 Consumers may consequently opt for simpler
strategies that minimize efforts to search for an energy supplier and a supply con-
tract.108 Rather than choosing the optimal offer, they may simply opt for the first
contract they encounter that offers to supply energy on acceptable conditions and
at acceptable tariffs. They may also decide not even to start searching for a better
energy supply contract.109 They may also be optimistic enough to think “I have
managed my energy supply well,” whereas the perceived costs of searching for a
new energy supplier may not in practice actually outweigh the gains that such a
contract can offer. The abovementioned insights should be taken into account by
supervisory authorities when designing remedies for energy suppliers to provide
information on energy contacts, tariffs, and conditions. Indeed, more information
may deactivate consumers instead of activating them.
103 Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 4; Simon, supra note 76.
104 Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 78; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 12.
105 Sheena Iyengar &Mark R. Lepper,When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a
Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995 (2000).
106 Id.; VAN DIJK & ZEELENBERG, supra note 75, at 30.
107 OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra
note 13; The Functioning of Electricity Retail Markets, supra note 7, at 21; ACM, MONITOR
CONSUMENTENMARKT ELEKTRICITEIT EN GAS 2010 ch. 5 (Authority for Consumers and
Markets [Autoriteit Consument en Markt] 2011); ACM, ONDERZOEK KWALITEIT VAN
PRIJSVERGELIJKERS VOOR ENERGIE (Authority for Consumers and Markets [Autoriteit
Consument en Markt] 2011); MARKET RESPONSE, HELP CONSUMENTEN DOOR DE BOMEN
HET BOS TE ZIEN—RAPPORTAGE | KWANTITATIEF ONDERZOEK NAAR KETENTRANSPARANTIE
ENERGIEBRANCHE (Report prepared for ACM2013).
108 OFGEM, WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra
note 13, at 11.
109 Id. at 11–13.
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Fourth, according to traditional economic theory, consumers make choices that
are in their interests.110 Behavioral economics studies show that primacy and
maximizing their own gains are not always key drivers of the choice behavior of
consumers.111 Consumers are ready to adopt prosocial behavior in the sense
that, when making consumption decisions, they also take public interests, such
as a clean environment, into consideration.112 Pro-environmental behavior also
accords, at least partially, with the rational choice model, as consumer prefer-
ences may also include a preference for a clean environment. It is not always
easy, however, to attribute an economic value to preferences for environmentally
friendly products and services or other prosocial considerations.113
Energy consumers are also willing to let environmental considerations play
a role in their decision making, as evidenced by the fact that more and more
consumers are switching to green energy and are willing to pay more for this
type of energy.114 The extent to which individual consumers actually engage in
pro-environmental behavior depends on contextual factors (such as income
and social environment) and psychological factors (such as attitudes and per-
sonal norms) and deserves further investigation.115
F. Observations
The above studies indicate that energy consumers do not usually make optimal
choices when selecting their energy supply contracts. In other words, they do
not act in the rational manner desired by the European legislator, as their
choices are biased by hyperbolic discounting, status quo bias, loss aversion, and
simplified choice strategies. Instead of acting as responsible and rational consu-
mers, in practice they tend to behave as “trusting consumers.”116
Consequently, many consumers do not switch to more advantageous con-
tracts and so miss out on various financial and qualitative benefits.117
Empirical research from the United Kingdom shows that energy suppliers
110 Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 66.
111 VAN DIJK & ZEELENBERG, supra note 75, at 28.
112 Linda Steg & Charles Vlek, Encouraging Pro-Environmental Behaviour: An Integrative Review
and Research Agenda, 29 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 309 (2009).
113 POTTERS & PRAST, supra note 2, at 55.
114 Kaenzig, Heinzle & Wüstenhagen, supra note 95, at 311; The Functioning of Electricity Retail
Markets for Consumers in the European Union, supra note 7; ACM TRENDRAPPORTAGE 2011, supra
note 92, at 11; ACM, TRENDRAPPORTAGE MARKTWERKING EN CONSUMENTENVERTROUWEN IN
DE ENERGIEMARKT—TWEEDE HALFJAAR 2012 (Authority for Consumers and Markets [Autoriteit
Consument enMarkt] 2013) [hereinafter ACMTRENDRAPPORTAGE 2012].
115 Chris von Borgstede, Maria Andersson & Filip Johnsson, Public Attitudes to Climate Change
and Carbon Mitigation—Implications for Energy-Associated Behaviours, 57 ENERGY POL’Y 182–
93 (2013).
116 MICKLITZ, OEHLER, PIORKOWSKY, REISCH & STRÜNCK, supra note 54, at 1.
117 ACM TRENDRAPPORTAGE 2012, supra note 114; OFGEM, THE RETAIL MARKET REVIEW—
DRAFT IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE UPDATED DOMESTIC PROPOSALS—CONSULTATION
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take advantage of the predictable characteristics of consumers’ behavior in
order to make even higher profits. They can charge the large group of inactive
consumers higher prices than those charged to the relatively smaller group of
active consumers. This leads to unjustified discrimination and can have an
adverse impact on competition between energy suppliers.118 Evidence also
shows that certain consumers, namely vulnerable consumers, have even more
grounds for misperception and cognitive limitations than other groups of
consumers.119 These vulnerable consumers consequently have a high risk of
paying disadvantageous, excessive prices for their energy supply and thus
ending up with financial problems.
IV. MORE EFFICIENT ENERGYUSE ATHOME
According to the model of the rational and responsible consumer used by the
European legislator, consumers aim to consume as much energy as they need
and try to minimize, as much as possible, the costs of their energy consump-
tion.120 In practice, however, consumers are often unaware of their energy con-
sumption and the opportunities for their households to save energy.121 The
abovementioned biases regarding the purchase of energy contracts can also be
applied to the choices of consumers regarding their energy behavior and the
way they deal with possibilities to apply energy efficient technologies and
habits at home.122 For instance, households may prefer not to decrease their
energy use as they do not want to lower their standard of living (status quo bias
and loss aversion), or they make simplified decisions about their energy use as
they are unaware of their consumption and costs. For policymakers it is im-
portant to understand why consumers behave the way they do regarding their
energy use at home, whether there are differences between different groups of
PAPER 135B/12, at 35–36 (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 2012); ECME
CONSORTIUM, supra note 82, at 61.
118 Monica Giulietti, Catherine Waddams Price & Michael Waterson, Consumer Choice and
Competition Policy: A Study of the UK Energy Markets, 115 ECON. J. 949, 963 (2005); OFGEM,
WHAT CAN BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS SAY ABOUT GB ENERGY CONSUMERS?, supra note 13.
119 See, e.g., FDS INTERNATIONAL, RESEARCH REPORT ON VULNERABLE CONSUMERS’
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ENERGY MARKET (2008); IPSOS MORI, CUSTOMER ENGAGEMENT
WITH THE ENERGY MARKET—TRACKING SURVEY (2011); OFGEM, CONSUMER VULNERABILITY
STRATEGY—FINAL DECISION 102/13, supra note 51.
120 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Energy Efficiency and
Repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, art. 8, COM (2011) 370 final (June 22, 2011).
121 WEBER, supra note 10, at 392; DECC, HEAT AND ENERGY SAVING STRATEGY—
CONSULTATION (Department for Energy and Climate Change 2009); OFGEM, CONSUMER
ATTITUDES AND AWARENESS OF GREEN ISSUES AND ENERGY—FACTSHEET IN THE
CONSUMER FIRST—ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH SUMMARY SERIES (The Office of Gas and
Electricity Markets 2008).
122 WEBER, supra note 10.
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consumers, and which types of measures could be targeted at (different groups
of) consumers to behave in a more energy efficient way.123
Various empirical studies have set out to identify the best interventional
measures to achieve more energy-efficient behavior of consumers regarding
their household energy use. Certain studies have shown that giving feedback,
and particularly frequent and direct feedback, can reduce energy consumption
in households.124 A combination of interventional strategies, such as providing
information, feedback, and personal advice, appears to be most effective in
reducing households’ energy consumption.125 More research is needed,
however, to establish whether the observed behavioral changes are more than
temporary.126 Indeed, most analyses of consumer behavior in the energy
sector look at the behavior over a specific and limited period of time of a
limited group of consumers, whose motivation to save energy is also more
likely to be above average. For these reasons, energy supervisors should base
any future interventional measures on more thorough and comprehensive re-
search, also investigating whether further distinctions between different groups
of consumers must be made.127
V. GUIDELINES FOR INTEGRATING BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS INTO
THE REGULATIONOF THE ENERGY SECTOR
A. Integrating Behavioral Economics into Regulation for More
Effective Governmental Policies
Though the aforementioned studies are conducted in different EU Member
States with varying economic and social circumstances, a pattern may be dis-
cerned providing clear indications that the average energy consumer in practice
does not behave in conformity with the model of the rational consumer that is
the basis of the EU energy directives. To some extent the biases in consumer
decision making in the energy market can be attributed to the complexity of
123 Bernadette Sütterlin, Thomas A. Brunner & Michael Siegrist, Who Puts the Most Energy into
Energy Conservation? A Segmentation of Energy Consumers Based on Energy-Related Behavioural
Characteristics, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 8137 (2011).
124 Hunt Allcott & Sendhill Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCIENCE 1204 (2010);
Wokje Abrahamse, Linda Steg, Charles Vlek & Talib Rothengatter, A Review of Intervention
Studies Aimed at Household Energy Conservation, 25 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 273, 281 (2005);
Sarah Darby, Smart Metering: What Potential for Householder Engagement?, 38 BUILDING
RESEARCH & INFO. 442 (2010); Brounen, Kok & Quigley, supra note 11; BLOM, BLES,
LEGUIJT, ROOIJERS, VAN GERWEN, VAN HAMEREN & VERHEIJ, supra note 35, at 111–16;
AECOM, ENERGY DEMAND RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL ANALYSIS (2011).
125 Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek & Rothengatter, supra note 124, at 282.
126 Id. at 273–91; Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 21; BLOM, BLES, LEGUIJT, ROOIJERS,
VAN GERWEN, VAN HAMEREN & VERHEIJ, supra note 35, at 113.
127 Pollitt & Shaorshadze, supra note 36, at 21; Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek & Rothengatter, supra note
124, 273–91; BLOM, BLES, LEGUIJT, ROOIJERS, VAN GERWEN, VAN HAMEREN & VERHEIJ,
supra note 35, at 113.
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the information regarding energy contracts, prices, and conditions, as well as
to the uncertainties about future costs and benefits of different types of energy
contracts and to the purchase of more expensive energy efficient appliances.
These characteristics of the energy market result in certain search and transac-
tion costs for the consumers that drive them to stay with (financially less
attractive) default options. Several reports show that especially vulnerable con-
sumers may be confronted with overly expensive energy contracts. Those con-
sumers also run the risk of being excluded from technological innovations, such
as smart meters, smart grids, and demand response programs. Additionally,
limited consumer participation in the energy market and environmentally un-
friendly choices, may lead to external effects, including the distortion of compe-
tition on the retail market and negative effects for the environment.
Considering the characteristics of the energy market and the external effects
of consumer behavior on this market, there are good reasons to argue that a
target group-specific consumer policy in the energy sector is justified. From a
legal perspective this would mean that the average energy consumer would not
be interpreted as a rational Homo Economicus. Instead the average energy
consumer is seen as a real, trusting consumer with limited time and certain
biases who may need some extra help to participate in a rational and
responsible way in the energy market.
However, the European Union and its Member States should conduct
more thorough empirical studies into the preferences and biases of the behav-
ior of energy consumers and investigate which type of energy consumers may
be distinguished. This research should take into account that the intensity of
consumers’ preferences and biases may differ across and within EU Member
States, depending on external factors such as social norms, income, and
climate. It is important for policymakers to have a well-founded, realistic, and
nuanced image of consumers’ behavior in order to design effective remedies
that can be targeted to the characteristics of different groups of energy consu-
mers to stimulate behavioral change.128 For instance, the expected increase in
energy prices raises the question of which consumers belong to the group of
vulnerable consumers that may require additional protection or need assist-
ance if they are to fulfill the roles envisaged by the legislator. Unlike in the
United Kingdom, this issue has received little attention in the Netherlands,
with the risk that rising numbers of consumers may ultimately be unable to
continue paying their energy bills.129
More thorough empirical research is also needed to establish whether the
reasons for different behavior than envisaged by the legislator within the ration-
al choice model can primarily be attributed to a lack of information or to
search costs (according to the theory of “bounded rationality”), or whether
128 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 74; Maria Lissowska, Overview of Behavioural Economics Elements
in the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 393, 397 (2011).
129 OFGEM, PROPOSALS FOR A NEW CONSUMER VULNERABILITY STRATEGY, supra note 49.
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other psychological factors, such as the status quo bias, hyperbolic discounting
and simplified decision-making strategies, also play a role in prompting consu-
mers, unconsciously, to make non-optimal choices. The legislator and super-
visory authorities need to be much more aware that consumer empowerment
—through the imposition, for example, of information disclosure obligations
on energy suppliers—may be counterproductive if consumers are not actually
interested in making informed decisions. In such circumstances, empower-
ment may simply reinforce the behavior that the legislator is seeking to discour-
age; for example, consumers switching to contracts that are not beneficial for
them. If they wish to follow a behavioral economics approach by taking into
account recurring biases in the behavior of the energy consumers, govern-
ments could consider opting for a more paternalistic form of intervention,
such as pre-set contract templates with standard terms or default contracts.
The following parts illustrate what are the relevant legal principles for the in-
tegration of behavioral insights in the regulation of the energy sector. They will
discuss the limits and possibilities of using a behavioral economics approach to
stimulate energy consumers to act in a responsible and active way. The focus
here is on the different (legal, economic, psychological) tools that the legislator
and supervisory authorities may use to promote consumer participation in the
energy market.
B. Flexible Mandate for Energy Supervisors
First, it is important for Member States to ensure, in accordance with European
law, that energy supervisory authorities have sufficient competences and scope to
effectively protect and promote consumers’ interests.130 In principle, the Third
Package’s directives do not present any obstacles for national legislators in this
respect; the latter can choose whether to oblige supervisory authorities to assess
ex ante the impact that measures promoting consumer empowerment have on
the behavior of consumers.131 If this were required, supervisory authorities
would proactively have to assess the potential effects of the proposed measures
on consumers’ behavior, based on sound empirical research. Their interventions
would then have to be tailored to accommodate the expected changes in consu-
mers’ behavior. Furthermore, the supervisory authorities would also be required
to evaluate the effects of the applicable regulatory instruments already in place
and adjust or withdraw them, for instance, because they have become superflu-
ous as a result of more experienced and mature consumer behavior.132
130 Directive 2009/72/EC, supra note 3, arts. 36–37.
131 Saskia A.C.M. Lavrijssen & Annetje T. Ottow, The Legality of Independent Regulatory
Authorities, in THE ECLIPSE OF THE LEGALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 73
(Leonard F.M. Besselink, Frans Pennings & Sacha Prechal eds., Kluwer Law International
2011).
132 Schinkel, supra note 9.
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C. Mix of Instruments
Second, it is important for supervisory authorities to be able to choose from a
mix of legal, economic, and psychological tools if they are to encourage energy
consumers to participate in the market actively and to save energy in their
households. In doing so, they will have to respect the conditions imposed by
European law, including the free movement and competition provisions, and
the general and sector-specific consumer directives. The various consumer
empowerment instruments can be divided into (1) remedies that stimulate
more energy efficient behavior of consumers; (2) remedies that stimulate the
purchase of green energy; (3) remedies that stimulate the exercise of the right
to choose one’s supplier and (4) remedies targeted at vulnerable customers.
In line with the European proportionality principle, supervisory authorities
should select the appropriate and necessary regulatory tools that harm the least
other interests, such as the commercial freedom of businesses and effective
competition.133 In line with the premise of the free choice of supplier and the
proportionality principle, consumers should be encouraged, wherever pos-
sible, to make optimal choices in terms of price, conditions, sustainability, and
quality. Thaler and Sunstein speak in this respect of “libertarian paternalism,”
whereby rather than making choices on behalf of consumers, the legislator and
supervisory authorities seek to influence consumers’ behavior by, for example,
giving them user friendly information about different choices.134
Taking into account the proportionality principle, it is advisable that au-
thorities first consider whether informational remedies are sufficient to target
certain biases of consumer behavior. Heavier interventions should be consid-
ered only if less intrusive measures for regulating the disclosure of information
fail and the supervisory authorities show that less far-reaching measures were
not sufficient to achieve changes in behavior.135
A behavioral economics approach to the regulation of the energy sector
demands the imposition on energy suppliers of information disclosure obliga-
tions that extend beyond the traditional economic approach based on the ra-
tional choice model and the “bounded rationality” theory.136 According to
behavioral economics, it is not the disclosure of information, but primarily the
disclosure of high-quality, user-friendly information that can give consumers a
better understanding of the choices available to them, and thus improves their
133 Walter van Gerven, De Beginselen “Subsidiariteit, Evenredigheid en Samenwerking” in het
Europese Gemeenschapsrecht, 36 RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD 1241–46 (1992). See also Case
331/88, FEDESA, 1990 E.C.R. I-4023.
134 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5–6.
135 Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regulations, 43 J.
REGULATORY ECON. 248, 256 (2013).
136 Fabiana di Porto, Information Challenges for the Post-Liberalized Italian Energy Retail Markets:
How Regulation and Competition Rules Shape Information Flows 21 (paper for the fourth annual
conference on competition and regulation in network industries, 2011).
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ability to compare offers and to assess which choice provides them with
optimal prices, quality, and sustainability.137
Another remedy that may have a major impact on consumer behavior is the
imposition of default options, such as green energy contracts.138 The defaults
may direct consumers toward contracts that are most beneficial for them, both
from a financial and environmental perspective. These defaults may signifi-
cantly reduce transaction costs and search costs as well non-optimal (for
example, too expensive or grey) choices. Consequently, at an aggregate level
defaults may promote economic and social welfare.139 However, defaults will
only have these beneficial effects if policymakers have accurate information
about the preferred choices of (different) groups of energy consumers. If there
is too little known about what consumers would prefer there should be a
restrained use of defaults.140
In Table 1, the recurring biases or characteristics in consumer behavior in
the energy sector are illustrated. Table 1 makes clear how different remedies
could be targeted at these characteristics to achieve certain changes in consu-
mers’ behavior that are in the consumers’ own interests. At the same time,
these remedies can also deal with external effects and therefore serve broader
public policy goals. The table highlights the scale from lighter remedies (at the
top of the columns) to heavier remedies (at the bottom of the columns), with
information strategies on the one side and regulated prices on the other side of
the two extremes.
1. Price Comparison Tools
One of the behavioral remedies that frequently recurs in the abovementioned
table is the supervision of price comparison websites. Private websites enabling
comparisons between energy suppliers (price comparison sites) can help
energy consumers to process complex information.141 This will only happen,
however, if these price comparison tools are independent, transparent, up to
date, accurate, complete, accessible, and user friendly.142 Price comparison
tools’ independence is endangered if the tools are owned by an energy sup-
plier, and also if they enter into profit-oriented contracts with one or two
energy suppliers and consequently direct consumers primarily to these suppli-
ers, even though the latter may not necessarily offer the most favorable
137 Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: A Behavioral Economics Account 11 (NYU
Center for Law, Economics and Organization, Research Paper No. 11–42, 2011).
138 Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 95; Pichert & Katsikopoulos, supra note 17.
139 Cas R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J.
1826, 1882 (2013).
140 Sunstein & Reisch, supra note 95, at 14.
141 Harriet C. Gamper, How Can Internet Comparison Sites Work Optimally for Consumers?, 35 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 335 (2012).
142 CEER, CEER DRAFT ADVICE ON PRICE COMPARISON TOOLS—A CEER PUBLIC
CONSULTATION PAPER 13 (Council of European Energy Regulators, C11-CEM-45-5, 2011).
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Table 1. Behavioral biases and corresponding remedies
Remedies/
Behavior Bias
Free choice of supplier Energy efficiency Vulnerable customer Green choices
Time-varying
discounts
(1) Facilitating collective switching
schemes.









(2) Labeling (disclosure of







(1) Personalized advice and
standard personal calculations
(that is, detailed customer
specific projection of the cost of
a tariff per year).
(2) Regular information on the
cheapest tariffs based on the
range of tariffs provided by the
current supplier.
(3) Nondiscrimination obligations.
(4) Setting standard (default)
contracts with set tariffs and
terms.
(5) Setting tariff structures and
regulating price levels.
(6) Setting standard contracts with
fixed tariffs and terms.
1. Price comparison tools
making the benefits of
green contracts salient.
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Note: Remedies are ordered from the least to the most intrusive remedies. The remedies have been inspired by various national and international reports (such as
those prepared by Ofgem in the United Kingdom and ACM in the Netherlands) and EU and national energy legislation. The table is not meant to be exhaustive,
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contracts.143 This shows how important it is for energy supervisory and con-
sumer protection authorities to ensure that price comparison tools comply
with the above requirements and also with consumer protection legislation.
Research conducted by the Dutch ACM found the Dutch price comparison
websites, as opposed to marketing channel websites affiliated to one or more
energy suppliers, to be reliable and transparent, and to offer consumers wide-
ranging choices and significant price advantages.144 However, the research
also found that, owing to product complexity, contract comparability remained
difficult. In addition, there are more than ten websites regarded by the ACM
as price comparison tools, and this can cause confusion among consumers.145
The standard consumption values applicable to various groups of consumers
(that is, estimations that consumers can use if they do not know their exact
consumption levels) can also vary from one price comparison tool to another,
while the way consumers enter their data may also produce differing results.
There is a risk, therefore, that consumers may be put off by having to decide
which price comparison tool to use and may consequently not even start com-
paring contracts of different suppliers.
The above could imply a greater role for governments in setting the condi-
tions for the functioning of such price comparison tools, provided this does not
hinder innovation and competition between price comparison tools from a user-
friendliness and accessibility perspective. Governments could, for example, set
requirements for how information and search results have to be displayed, and for
how consumers have to enter their data in order to ensure proper comparisons.146
A further step could be to harmonize standard consumption values and consumer
profiles or to allow consumers to copy their consumption scores directly from
their current energy supplier’s website to the price comparison tool. Once they
have entered their data, it will be only a small step for consumers to use an auto-
mated system to select the most favorable energy provider based on the informa-
tion they themselves have filled in. Systems such as these can significantly reduce
search and transaction costs and offer more or less customized options. They offer
the possibility to consumers to step over the hurdle of status quo bias, changing
preferences, and may as well counteract simplified decision-making strategies
based on false perceptions. Therefore, these forms of innovation could also en-
courage consumers to make the choices desired by the legislator.
It is important to note that some customers, specifically those with low
levels of literacy, cannot use a price comparison tool without help or advice.
The legislator needs, therefore, to identify these groups of consumers and to
find out how they can be assisted. The availability of alternatives to price
143 Gamper, supra note 141.
144 ACM, ENERGIEPRIJSVERGELIJKERS 2011—ONDERZOEK NAAR DE KWALITEIT VAN WEBSITES
DIE TARIEVEN EN VOORWAARDEN VAN ENERGIELEVERANCIERS VERGELIJKEN (Authority for
Consumers andMarkets [Autoriteit Consument en Markt] 2011).
145 Id. at 31.
146 Id. at 26.
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comparison tools for consumers without Internet access alsomust be established.
Inspiration can be drawn in this respect from the Flemish Community’s
Institutes for Community Development (Instituten voor Samenlevingsopbouw),
which provides people living in poverty with information on how they can
improve their housing conditions and energy performance.
2. Instruments of Psychological Control (Nudges)
Instruments such as information disclosure obligations, price comparison
tools, and the provision of direct feedback via displays and websites can be
combined with instruments of psychological control. An example of an instru-
ment of psychological control is the way that the costs and benefits of different
choices are presented to consumers. This is referred to as “framing.”147 The
literature discussed above suggests that, when deciding whether to switch to a
new energy contract or to adopt energy-saving measures, consumers are more
inclined to take risks to prevent potential losses rather than to achieve potential
gains relative to their current situation. Accordingly, it is very likely that consu-
mers will sooner react to the signal or the information that they are losing
money by not switching off some of their home appliances during peak hours,
than to the signal that they could earn money by shifting their energy con-
sumption outside the peak hours. The legislator can use such insights when
deciding what type of feedback energy suppliers should provide to consumers
on prices, costs, and consumption. The same goes for price comparison tools.
If the results displayed by the price comparison tools show that consumers are
losing money by not choosing for a certain contract or provider, consumers
will, according to behavioral economics insights, more likely be inclined to
switch than when results merely indicate the benefits of switching.
“Framing” is also a way to make consumers more aware of the long-term
benefits of energy supply contracts that are environmentally friendly, as
opposed to contracts supplying grey energy. Contracts for renewable energy
are better for the environment, while also resulting in lower CO2 emissions
and reducing the costs to society of repairing environmental damage.
Moreover, consumers seem willing to pay more for sustainable products, pro-
viding they understand how sustainable the supply contracts really are. Price
comparison tools could use “framing” to display their results by, for example,
placing the most environmentally friendly energy contracts at the top of the
search results and transparently showing that these contracts’ long-term bene-
fits exceed the short-term benefits of cheaper, grey energy contracts.
3. The Pros and Cons of a Behavioral Informed Approach
The advantage of the abovementioned forms of psychological control is that
they entail relatively few costs, while they are effective in influencing consu-
mers’ behavior by showing them the most favorable offer in terms of short and
147 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 39.
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long-term costs and benefits.148 As Will Tiemeijer indicated, however, ethics
also play a role in governments’ deployment of such instruments of psycho-
logical control.149 Governments must ensure that consumers are not manipu-
lated.150 In other words, they should not push consumers in a direction that is
not necessarily in their interest or without their being aware of such implicit or
hidden influences. According to Johnson, Shu, Dellaert, Fox, Goldstein,
Häubl, Larrick, Payne, Peters, Schkade, Wansink, and Weber: “if defaults have
an effect because consumers are not aware that they have choices or because the
transaction costs of changing from the default are too high, defaults impinge on
liberty.”151
This also gives rise to a fundamental question. Is the freedom of choice a
fundamental consumer right that should, as much as possible, be respected?152
Or is it an instrument for steering the energy sector in a socially optimal way?
Although many lawyers and economists may opt for the first approach,153 the
second is perhaps closer to reality. Consumers may strive for individual prosper-
ity and happiness when making decisions, but in practice they may experience
difficulties making decisions that are in harmony with these ends.154 In the latter
case, there are also fewer fundamental objections against influencing consumers’
freedom of choice if this achieves their own and society’s general prosperity
objectives, especially when the nudges do not impose significant costs on consu-
mers and on society.155
According to Tiemeijer, the next question that arises is whether govern-
ments are actually able to determine the best choices for their citizens.156
Governments, after all, can also make mistakes when seeking to influence con-
sumer behavior. Incorrectly framed information, for example, can encourage
consumers to make choices that will adversely affect their welfare and will not
achieve the public interests as defined by the legislator. Supervisory authorities
may also fail to adequately document presumed consumers biases and prefer-
ences with sound empirical evidence, resulting in defective regulatory impact
assessments that form the basis of regulatory, psychological, or economic
148 Sunstein, supra note 139.
149 Will L. Tiemeijer, Slotbeschouwing, inDE MENSELIJKE BESLISSER: OVER DE PSYCHOLOGIE VAN
KEUZE EN GEDRAG, supra note 2, at 293–310.
150 Tiemeijer, supra note 149, at 293; Eric J. Johnson, Suzanne B. Shu, Benedict G.C. Dellaert,
Craig Fox, Daniel G. Goldstein, Gerald Häubl, Richard P. Larrick, John W. Payne, Ellen
Peters, David Schkade, Brian Wansink & Elke U. Weber, Beyond Nudges: Tools of a Choice
Architecture, 23 MKTG. LETTERS 487 (2012); Sunstein, supra note 139, at 1893–94.
151 Johnson, Shu, Dellaert, Fox, Goldstein, Häubl, Larrick, Payne, Peters, Schkade, Wansink &
Weber, supra note 150, at 492.
152 Sunstein, supra note 139, at 1879–81.
153 Sabine Frerichs, False Promises? A Sociological Critique of the Behavioural Turn in Law and
Economics, 34 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 289, 299 (2011).
154 Sunstein, supra note 139, 1876–77.
155 Id.
156 Tiemeijer, supra note 149, at 293.
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measures that are meant to target certain consumer biases.157 After having
examined several regulatory impact assessments accompanying energy efficiency
and fuel standards regulations, Ted Gayer and Kip Viscusi even suggest that the
“main failure of rationality is that of the regulators themselves.”158 Supervisory
authorities tend to focus too narrowly on elements (like energy efficiency or
competition) that fall within their legal mandates. Consequently they may
exclude from their analysis consumer preferences that provide reasonable expla-
nations for consumer behavior that, considering the circumstances, may seem
rational.159 The result may be that the adopted measures lead to perverse effects
as they stimulate consumer behavior that was not desired by the legislator or au-
thority in the first place.
However, the abovementioned limitations and risks do not seem to be
exclusively applicable to a behaviorally informed approach to the regulation of
the energy sector and the use of psychological steering instruments. All sorts of
government interventions may be subject to manipulation, undue influences
by interest groups (regulatory capture) and regulatory failure. Therefore these
dangers and limitations do not justify an outright negative view regarding the
use of behavioral economics in regulatory policy. However, they do require
that governments and supervisory authorities proceed in a very careful way
when they target consumer behavior with legal, economic, or psychological
interventions. In the first place, supervisory authorities should make sure that
their actions are grounded on a clear legal base. It is also important that gov-
ernments and supervisory authorities base their measures on sound empirical
evidence and consider the potentially adverse effects that interventions may
have on (some groups of) consumers. They must ensure that all measures
(legal, economic, and psychological) comply with the principles of good gov-
ernance, meaning that remedies should be transparent, reliable, objective,
user-friendly, correct, and proportional, and that they function independently
of any private interests.160
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Energy consumers have many faces. According to the European legislator,
they have an important role to play in achieving the objectives of European
energy policy, including a functioning energy market, affordable energy prices,
and security of supply, and also in achieving EU environmental and climate
goals. European and national legislators, as well as the supervisory authorities,
should take these different faces of energy consumers into account when draft-
ing legislation and policies to promote consumer participation in the energy
157 Gayer & Viscusi, supra note 135.
158 Id. at 263.
159 Id.
160 Leigh Hancher, Pierre Larouche & Saskia A.C.M. Lavrijssen, Principles of Good Market
Governance, 4 J. NETWORK INDUS. 355 (2003).
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market. If legislation and interventions are not sufficiently tailored to energy
consumers’ different roles and behavioral characteristics, the above objectives
are likely to be only partially, if at all, achieved.
A behavioral economics approach to the regulation of the energy sector—
where complementing and adding a nuance to the rational choice model—can
provide policymakers with valuable insights.161 It allows them to anticipate and
respond to certain characteristics of consumer behavior that are not easily
explained by the rational choice model, and which may make it more feasible to
achieve behavioral changes with consumers, even at relatively low costs. While the
rational and responsible consumer serves as an ideal for the legislator, the concept
of the average energy consumer is flexible enough to incorporate the dynamics of
real consumer behavior. Insights about real consumer behavior justify the formu-
lation of additional consumer protection provisions in the energy directives that
help the real consumers to behave in a responsible a mature way. At the same
time, these additional provisions could be withdrawn by the legislator when the
consumers’ real behavior is more in line with what the EU legislator expects
from them.
However, policymakers and supervisory authorities should be aware that the
integration of behavioral economics in the regulation of the energy sector is not
a cure-all approach for achieving behavioral change and broader public policy
goals.162 Inactive and biased consumer participation is just one of the reasons
that may explain the malfunctioning of the retail energy markets. Effective com-
petition and active consumer participation may also be distorted by the still
strong market positions of the incumbent production and supply companies. In
many EU Member States the energy companies are lagging behind in offering
innovative, green, and competitive services to consumers. Furthermore, there
may be failures in the legal framework governing the energy sector, in that gov-
ernments fail to adequately implement the EU legislation for the energy sector,
for instance, by not attributing adequate and autonomous regulatory and en-
forcement powers to supervisory authorities.163 It should also be noted that per-
forming sound empirical research into consumer behavior in the energy sector is
a costly and time-consuming activity. Governments and authorities should have
sufficient financial and personnel resources as well as the willingness to spend
enough time and resources to perform a proper empirical investigation. If they
do not, there is a serious risk of regulatory failure, in that the heterogeneous
preferences of consumers will not be adequately documented and the resulting
measures will have perverse effects.
Once governments and supervisory authorities have considered all the
pros, cons, and limitations of a behavioral approach toward the regulation of
the energy sector, they can combine traditional information remedies with
161 Rischkowsky & Döring, supra note 81, at 308.
162 Frerichs, supra note 153.
163 Lavrijssen & Ottow, supra note 131.
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innovative nudges, such as defaults, to influence consumers in the desired dir-
ection. This approach also offers the flexibility to adapt or withdraw measures
once consumers have sufficient experience choosing an energy supplier and
adopting energy-saving measures, and when non-optimal decisions become
less frequent. In such cases, paternalistic instruments of control can become
superfluous, at least to a certain extent.164
Although national supervisory authorities, such as Ofgem and ACM, and
the European Commission were the first to take steps to integrate a behavioral
economics approach into their regulation of energy markets, being able to do
so consistently and effectively represents a challenge for all European and na-
tional legislators and supervisory authorities. This article provides various
guidelines for shaping this integration. These guidelines set out a direction for
regulating the energy sector, but also give a more nuanced and realistic picture
of what can be achieved with a behaviorally informed approach.
164 Schinkel, supra note 9.
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